Libya is once again at the center of regional and international discussions following leaked information about the so-called Paul Initiative. This initiative, reportedly backed by the United States, aims to reorganize power in the country through new agreements between the major centers of influence in the east and west. These revelations come at a particularly sensitive moment for Libya, which has endured years of political division, institutional fragmentation, and struggles over power, wealth, and influence.
What stands out this time is that the conversation has shifted away from postponed elections, stalled constitutional frameworks, or even UN-sponsored political processes that have dominated discussions in recent years. Instead, the focus is now more clearly on reshaping authority through direct negotiations among the powers that hold military, economic, and security influence on the ground. This marks a significant change in how international actors are approaching the Libyan crisis.
It seems that some major capitals no longer view Libya merely as a crisis solvable through traditional means discussed since the Skhirat Agreement or the Geneva processes. Rather, they see it as a file that needs to be contained and managed according to the existing balance of power, regardless of the nature or extent of the controversies surrounding these forces.
From this perspective, we can understand the nature of the leaks related to the American initiative, which seems to advocate for Khalifa Haftar to head a new presidential council while keeping Abdul Hamid Dbeibah as the leader of a unified government. On the surface, this appears to be an attempt to resolve the division between the east and west, but fundamentally, it reflects a trend toward entrenching existing influence rather than building a genuine state.
What is being discussed is not the establishment of an inclusive national project or the building of independent institutions capable of governing the country beyond the logic of power. It is more akin to an agreement between two major networks of political, military, and economic influence, allowing each party to secure guarantees for their continued presence in the power equation for a longer period.
This situation reveals a significant dilemma, as Libya, which has paid a heavy price in recent years, is not only grappling with political division but also with the absence of a functioning state. Authority has devolved into a mix of temporary agreements, armed coalitions, and intertwined economic interests. Thus, any attempt to recreate the same scene with new faces will likely only postpone an impending explosion.
The danger of the proposed initiative lies in its clear implication that the international community may be losing interest in the idea of genuine democratic transformation within Libya. Instead, the focus seems to have shifted towards creating a superficial stability that ensures the continued flow of oil, prevents security collapse, and manages immigration and regional influence, even if that comes at the expense of Libyans’ right to build a legitimate state based on popular will.
After years of discussions about elections, constitutions, and concluding transitional phases, Libyans now find themselves facing a new approach centered around redistributing power among the most influential forces, as if the Libyan crisis is no longer a matter of a people seeking a state, but rather a matter of power centers looking for a way to organize their interests.
Furthermore, the idea of propelling Khalifa Haftar into the executive authority carries implications that extend beyond Libya itself. Haftar represents not only a rising military figure in eastern Libya but also an extension of a military and security project developed during years of conflict, enjoying extensive regional and international relationships. Mentioning his name at this juncture indicates a desire among some international players to build a more cohesive authority from a security standpoint, even if that disrupts political and social balances within western Libya.
However, those who believe Libya can be managed this simply overlook the nature of the Libyan composition. The situation in western Libya is not a monolithic block; the forces present in Tripoli, Misrata, Zintan, Zawiya, and among the Amazigh communities have their unique calculations, interests, and networks of influence. These forces will not easily accept being relegated to marginal roles within political arrangements being crafted outside of genuine national consensus.
Thus, the emerging opposition to the initiative cannot be underestimated. It is not merely a political stance against specific names but a concern that Libya could devolve into a battleground for sharing influence among families and armed groups rather than becoming a state governed by institutions and law.
Additionally, the proposal to keep Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in power raises many questions. Over the past few years, he has successfully built a broad network of financial and political alliances within western Libya and has exploited the state of division to maintain his position. However, his inclusion in any new arrangement may be interpreted as part of a deal aimed at ensuring a continued balance between power centers, nothing more.
In reality, the most dangerous outcome of recent years in Libya has been the transformation of authority into a massive source of economic interests. Complex networks of corruption, privileges, and loyalties have emerged within state institutions, and the persistence of division serves many parties that have accumulated influence and wealth in the absence of oversight and accountability. Therefore, any political initiative that does not address this deep economic structure of the crisis will remain a fragile agreement, prone to collapse at any moment.
It is also evident that the current American approach stems from a different understanding of the nature of the conflict in the region. The United States now views North Africa and the Sahel as open arenas for international competition, especially with the rising Russian presence, increasing security transformations in Sahel nations, recurring coups, and geopolitical shifts related to energy, migration, and terrorism. Consequently, Libya has become more than just a political file for Washington; it is now part of a broader battle concerning regional influence and the redrawing of interest maps.
Moreover, the current international tensions—whether related to the war in Ukraine, escalations in the Middle East, or indirect confrontations with Iran—are factors that make major powers more inclined to seek quick arrangements to ensure a minimum level of stability, even if these arrangements lack genuine popular legitimacy.
In contrast, the European stance appears confused and weak compared to previous stages. European countries, once major players in the Libyan file, are now less capable of influence due to internal divisions, economic crises, and increasing dependence on the American position in many international issues. This vacuum has given Washington greater space to operate independently within the Libyan arena.
However, any realistic assessment of the scene confirms that Libya is not a country easily subjected to external influence equations. The Libyan crisis has shown that any attempt to impose top-down solutions without true internal consensus always leads to more complexity and division. The tribal, social, military, and political balances within the country are too intricate to be simplified into an agreement between two personalities or camps.
Furthermore, southern Libya, which has remained relatively distant from the center of attention for years, has now become one of the most critical files related to regional security, especially with the ongoing changes in the Sahel and Sahara, the spread of armed groups, and the networks involved in smuggling and irregular migration. This means that any settlement that does not include a clear vision for addressing the security situation in the south will remain incomplete and incapable of achieving genuine stability.
In light of all these factors, Libya today appears to be at a genuine crossroads. Either these international movements will transform into an opportunity to launch a comprehensive national path that rebuilds the state on legitimate foundations and leads to real elections that conclude transitional phases, or the country will enter a new phase of power recycling through temporary arrangements that may provide relative calm but will not eliminate the roots of the crisis.
Stability built on sharing influence does not last long, and states are not built through closed deals but through a national contract that allows citizens to feel they are partners in shaping their future, not just spectators of agreements made between internal and external powers.
Thus, the real question today is not just about the potential success or failure of the Paul Initiative but about the future of the Libyan state itself. Is there still hope for building a unified national state with legitimate institutions and genuine sovereignty, or is the country gradually moving towards entrenching a model that manages division instead of ending it and organizes influence instead of building the state?
This is the greatest challenge facing Libya today, and it is also the true test for all local and international forces involved in this complex file. Peoples may accept temporary settlements under the pressure of crises, but ultimately they cannot live forever within a state suspended between war and ceasefire, authority and chaos, homeland and spoils.
